SUPREME COURT

• CRIMINAL

Ravindra Reddy Vs. Shaik Masthan and Ors. (Decided on 04.08.2008)

Circumstantial evidence - Whether conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence?

Conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence, but it should be tested by the touch- stone of law relating to circumstantial evidence laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Hanumant Govind Nargundkar and Anr. v. State of Madhya Pradesh wherein it was held that where the evidence is of a circumstantial nature, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be in the first instance be fully established and all the facts so established should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused. Again, the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency and they should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words, there must be a chain of evidence so far complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

• TENANCY

Kurella Naga Druva Vudaya Bhaskara Rao Vs.Galla Jani Kamma Alias Nacharamma (Decided on 04.08.2008)

Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Areas) Tenancy Act, 1956

Jurisdiction - Suit against Trespassers - Whether suit would lie in a civil court or in a revenue court

In a case, where the defendants-cultivating tenants denied the title of the plaintiffs as landlords and the tenancy and the plaintiffs filed suit treating defendants as trespassers and not as cultivating tenants, then the suit is not on the basis of the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. Such a suit against trespassers would lie only in the civil court and not in the revenue court.

Forum for settlement of disputes between landlord and cultivating tenant: Section 16 of Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Areas) Tenancy Act, 1956

Section 16 of the Act enables a landlord or cultivating tenant to approach the Special Officer for settlement of any dispute arising under the Act and it does not operate as a bar for a suit by an owner against a trespasser. Therefore, to attract Section 16, the person approaching the Special Officer should contend that he is either a landlord or a cultivating tenant, and admit the existence of the relationship of landlord and cultivating tenant between the parties.

• LIMITATION

Gulbarga University Vs. Mallikarjun S. Kodagali and Anr. (Decided on 01.08.2008)

Whether Section 14 of Limitation Act, 1963 applicable in proceeding under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 does not expressly exclude the applicability of Section 14 of the Limitation Act. The prohibitory provision has to be construed strictly. Therefore, provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would apply to arbitration proceedings as in proceedings in court.

HIGH COURT

• ARBITRATION

DELHI HIGH COURT 

Delhi Development Authority Vs Harbans Singh and Sons (Decided on 21.07.2008) MANU/DE/0997/2008

Arbitral Award-Whether the Arbitrator needs to give detailed reasons or show explicitly the computation or quantification of the amount arrived at by him in making the Arbitral Award

The purpose of arbitration is to provide a speedy and economical remedy for commercial disputes. Therefore, the Arbitrator is not required to give detailed judgment or detailed reasons or give the details of his computation or give his mental meanderings. It is sufficient if his thought process is indicated and the basis for awarding the amount is disclosed.

• ELECTRICITY

DELHI HIGH COURT

BSES Rajdhani Power Ltd.Vs. Ashok Kumar (Decided on 21.07.2008) MANU/DE/1013/2008

Whether Section 42 Sub-section (5) and (6) of Electricity Act, 2003 read with Section 145 of Electricity Act, 2003 exclude the jurisdiction of Civil Court and a consumer has necessarily to resort to the machinery as provided under this provision of the Act and cannot file a civil suit.

Section 145 of Electricity Act is not an omnibus Section which restricts the jurisdiction of Civil Court in respect of all and every matter that may arise concerning use of electricity by a consumer. It bars the jurisdiction of Civil Court only in respect of those matters which fall under Section 126 and 127. Further, Section 42 does not provide that the jurisdiction of Civil Court shall be barred once a Grievance Redressal Forum is created and comes into action. Rather Section 42 (8) specifically states that provisions of Sub-section (5), (6) and (7) shall be without prejudice to the right of consumer which he may have apart from the right conferred upon him by these sub-sections. Thus, the consumer has an option that before approaching the Civil Court he may take resort to Grievance Redressal system created under Section 42 (5). However, even after approaching the Grievance Redressal system, if he is not satisfied, he still has the remedy to approach the Civil Court for adjudication of his dispute.

• CRIMINAL

BOMBAY HIGH COURT 

D'damas Jewellery India Pvt. Ltd. A company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 through its authorised representative Mr. Krishnanand C. Kulkarni Vs. State of Maharashtra, Mr. Himanshu Kamlashankar Thakar and Mr. Rakesh L. Goda (Decided on 15.07.2008) MANU/MH/0611/2008

Procedure by the police upon seizure of property- Section 457 of Code of Criminal Procedure- Whether each and every order passed under Section 457 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, is to be considered as an interlocutory order

There are three eventualities visualized for exercise of power under Section 457(1).

1. Disposal of Property: Once the property is disposed of, which also includes destruction of property, during the pendency of the trial or before the conclusion of the trial, any order resulting in disposal of property including destruction of property can hardly be said to be an interlocutory order as such an order would automatically result in final adjudication in relation to the property ordered to be disposed of. In case the property is destroyed, nothing further remains to be considered in relation to the property. Therefore, such order cannot be said to be an interlocutory order as such an order will put an end to all the rights or interest in the property.

2. Delivery of Property: As regards the delivery of property to any person entitled for possession thereof, it will stand on the same footing as that of disposal of the property. In case of such delivery of property, it would be only after ascertaining the right of the person claiming to be entitled to have possession of such property. Therefore, such an order deciding the issue regarding right to possess the property cannot be said to be an interlocutory order.

3. Custody of Property: As regards the third eventuality under Section 457 of the Code, the order in such an eventuality would be only for custody of the property during the trial, subject to condition that the same should be produced at any time required by the Court. Such an order would certainly fall within the category of interlocutory order as one cannot attach any finality to such an order since it does not decide any right to the property nor it implies any adjudication of any issue as such.

MADRAS HIGH COURT

F. Sheik Hussain Vs. Faridha Banu (Decided on 04.07.2008) MANU/TN/0818/2008

Scope of Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code - Interference by Appellate Court in concurrent findings of lower courts by re-appreciation of evidence

A concurrent finding of fact cannot be interfered with by High Court under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code by re-appreciating the evidence. The scope of Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. is very very limited and only pure questions of law can be gone into and not the factual findings and as such the Court would not be inclined to re-appreciate the evidence and come to a different conclusion from the courts below.

• EXCISE

ANDHRA PRADESH HIGH COURT

Mandakini Restaurant and Bar Vs. Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition and Excise and Ors. (Decided on 14.05.2008) MANU/AP/0200/2008 

Renewal of Bar Licence- Form 2B-Licence- Rule 6 and Rule 9-A of A.P. Excise (Grant of Licence of Selling by Bar and Conditions of Licence) Rules, 2005 - Whether it is obligatory on the part of a person who seeks a renewal of bar licence to fulfill all the conditions contained in Rule 6 of Act like a person who seeks a fresh license to establish a bar and restaurant

It is legally well settled that renewal is nothing but continuation of the previous licence. It therefore necessarily follows that what is required for granting a fresh licence is equally required for granting renewal, unless such a requirement is specifically excluded by the provision dealing with the renewals. Rule 9-A, which deals with renewal, does not specifically exclude any of the requirements contained in Rule 6. Therefore, since it is obligatory for a person, who seeks to establish a bar and restaurant, to fulfill all the conditions contained in Rule 6, it is equally obligatory for a licensee to satisfy the licensing authority that he continues to comply with all those conditions, which are envisaged in Rule 6, if his licence is renewed and so long as he continues to run the Bar and Restaurant.

Further, no person has any fundamental right to carry on trade in liquor. Thus, unless a person satisfies all the conditions envisaged in Rule 6, he cannot claim to have any right to run a bar and restaurant.

• CIVIL/CONTRACT

KERALA HIGH COURT

C.P. Mujeeb Vs.Royal Hospital Pvt. Ltd. and Anr. ( Decided on 03.06.2008) MANU/KE/0111/2008

Order 1 Rule 10 of Code of Civil Procedure - Whether in a suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale and also for possession of the property covered under the agreement for sale, third parties who are setting up rival claims against the executant of the agreement for sale, could be impleaded as additional defendants or necessary parties

When persons who are sought to be impleaded as defendants are setting up right with semblance of title and that too by a series of registered deeds, it cannot be said that they are not necessary parties to the suit. It is therefore not possible to hold that in all cases a third party to an agreement for sale cannot be impleaded in a suit for specific performance of the agreement for sale, more so when the prayer in the suit includes a prayer for possession of the property covered under the agreement for sale as provided under Section 22(1)(a) of Specific Relief Act. In such a suit the right of the rival claim of the defendants, who claim possession would also necessarily be decided especially to avoid multiplicity of proceedings.

• FAMILY

MADRAS HIGH COURT

F. Sheik Hussain Vs. Faridha Banu (Decided on 04.07.2008) MANU/TN/0818/2008

Claim for maintenance beyond three iddat periods- Section 3(i)(a) of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 - Whether a divorce Muslim woman is entitled to claim maintenance beyond three iddat periods as per provisions of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986

Liability of the Muslim husband to his divorced wife arising under Section 3(i)(a) of the Act to pay maintenance is not confined to the iddat period. A Muslim husband is liable to make reasonable and fair provision for the future of the divorced wife which obviously includes her maintenance as well. Such a reasonable and fair provision extending beyond the iddat period must be made by the husband within the iddat period in terms of Section 3(i)(a) of the Act.