• CRIMINAL LAWS

Supreme Court of The United States

Kentucky Vs. King certiorari to the supreme court of kentucky (Decided on 16.05.2011)

Exigent Circumstances - Destruction of Evidence - Police raided the house of the suspect without warrant after announcing there arrival  suspecting destruction of evidence - Circuit Court denied Respondent's motion to suppress the evidence, holding that exigent circumstances (the need to pre-vent destruction of evidence) and justified the warrantless entry- Respondent entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed - Hence this appeal - Whether exigent circumstances existed, but it nonetheless invalidated the search

Held, exigent circumstances rule applies when the police do not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct that violates the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment expressly imposes two requirements. All searches and seizures must be reasonable; and a warrant may not be issued unless probable cause is properly established and the scope of the authorized search is set out with particularity. The proper test follows from the principle that permits warrant less searches: warrant less searches are allowed when the circumstances make it reasonable, within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, to dispense with the warrant requirement. Thus, a warrant less entry based on exigent circumstances is reasonable when the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct violating the Fourth Amendment. The ability of officers to respond to an exigency cannot turn on such subtleties as the officers' tone of voice in announcing their presence and the forcefulness of their knocks. Respondent's test would make it extremely difficult for officers to know how loudly they may announce their presence or how forcefully they may knock with-out running afoul of the police created exigency rule. Assuming that an exigency existed here, there is no evidence that the officers either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so prior to the point when they entered the apartment. Assuming an exigency did exist, the officers' conduct banging on the door and announcing their presence was entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment. Respondent has pointed to no evidence supporting his argument that the officers made any sort of "demand" to enter the apartment, much less a demand that amounts to a threat to violate the Fourth Amendment. If there is contradictory evidence that has not been brought to this Court's attention, the state court may elect to address that matter on remand.

• SERVICE LAWS

Supreme Court of The United States

Cigna Corp. Et al. Vs. Amara et al., Individually (Decided on 16.05. 2011)

Pension Plan - Change in Plan by District Circuit - Challenge against thereto - §§102(a), 104(b), and 204(h) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) - Petitioner CIGNA Corporation's pension plan provided a retiring employee with an annuity based on pre retirement salary and length of service replaced it with new plan that annuity with a cash balance based on a defined annual contribution from CIGNA, increased by compound interest - District Court found that CIGNA's disclosures violated its obligations under §§102(a), 104(b), and 204(h) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) held that CIGNA's notice defects had caused the employees "likely harm" and reformed the new plan and ordered CIGNA to pay benefits accordingly- Second Circuit affirmed - Hence this appeal

Held Although §502(a)(1)(B) did not give the District Court authority to reform CIGNA's plan, relief is authorized by §502(a)(3), which allows a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary "to obtain other appropriate equitable relief" to redress violations of ERISA "or the plan's. However, that provision which speaks of "enforcing" the plan's terms, not changing them does not suggest that it authorizes a court to alter those terms here, where the change, akin to reforming a contract, seems less like the simple enforcement of a con-tract as written and more like an equitable remedy. Nothing in§502(a)(1)(B) suggests the contrary. This Court has interpreted §502(a)(3)'s phrase "appropriate equitable relief" as referring to " 'those categories of relief ' that, be-fore the merger of law and equity," 'were typically available in equity.' That court is to conduct the analysis in the first instance, but there are several equitable principles that it might apply on remand. Neither ERISA's relevant substantive provisions nor §502(a)(3) sets a particular standard for determining harm. And equity law provides no general principle that "detrimental reliance" must be proved before a remedy is decreed. To the extent any such requirement arises, it is because the specific remedy being contemplated imposes that requirement. Thus, when a court exercises authority under §502(a)(3)to impose a remedy equivalent to estoppel, a showing of detrimental reliance must be made. However, equity courts did not insist on a detrimental reliance showing where they ordered reformation where a fraudulent suppression, omission, or insertion materially affected the substance of a contract. Nor did they require a detrimental reliance showing when they ordered surcharge. They simply ordered a trust or beneficiary made whole following a trustee's breach of trust. This flexible approach belies a strict detrimental reliance requirement. It is not difficult to imagine how the failure to provide proper summary information here, in violation of ERISA, injured employees even if they did not them-selves act in reliance on the summaries. Thus, to obtain relief by surcharge for violations of §§102(a) and 104(b), a plan participant or beneficiary must show that the violation caused injury, but need show only actual harm and causation, not detrimental reliance hence appeal vacated and remanded.