• CRIMINAL

Supreme Court of The United States

Fowler Vs. United States (Decided on 26.05 2011)

Conviction for offence charged under 18 U. S. C. §1512(a)(1)(C) - Challenged against thereto - Whether evidence was insufficient to show that the accused had killed the deceased/officer intending to prevent him to communicate with federal officer

Held, Government must establish a §1512(a)(1)(C) violation by showing there was a reasonable likelihood that a relevant communication would have been made to a federal officer. In a §1512(a)(1)(C) prosecution, "no state of mind need be proved with respect to the circumstance that the law enforcement officer is an employee of the Federal Government," §. Thus, the Government must prove a killing, committed with a particular intent, namely, an intent to "prevent" a "communication" about "the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense" to a federal "law enforcement. The Government and the Eleventh Circuit would rest their standard on the word "possible." But that standard would eliminate the independent force of the statutory "federal officer" requirement, and would extend the statute beyond its intended, basically federal, scope. Fashioning a standard based on the word "likely" is consistent with the statute's language and objectives. Thus, where the Defendant kills a person with an intent to prevent communication with law enforcement officers generally, that intent includes an intent to prevent communications with federal officers only if there is a reasonable likelihood under the circumstances that, in the absence of the killing, at least one of the relevant communications would have been made to a federal officer. The Government need not show that such a communication, had it occurred, would have been federal beyond a reasonable doubt, nor even that it is more likely than not. But it must show that the likelihood of communication to a federal officer was more than remote, outlandish, or hypothetical. Accused argument that the evidence was insufficient to satisfy a "reasonable likelihood" standard was not raised at trial, the lower courts must determine whether, and how, the standard applies in this case. Hence, matter vacated and remanded.

Supreme Court of the United States

United States v. Tinklenberg (Decided on 26.05.2011)

Delay in Trial - Violation of The Speedy Trial Act of 1974 (Act) - Respondent Trial on federal drug and gun charges began after 287 days after his arraignment - District Court denied the motion on ground that the Trial violated the 70 days requirement of the Speedy Trial - On Appeal the Sixth Circuit held that 287 days were excludable, but concluded that 9 days during which three pretrial motions were pending were not, because the motions did not actually cause a delay, or the expectation of delay, of trial. Since these 9 days were sufficient to bring the number of non excludable days above 70, the court found a violation of the Act and as the Respondent had already served his prison sentence, ordered the indictment dis-missed with prejudice - Hence this appeal

Held, the Act contains no requirement that the filing of a pretrial motion actually caused, or was expected to cause, delay of a trial. Rather, §3161(h)(1)(D) stops the Speedy Trial clock from running automatically upon the filing of a pretrial motion irrespective of whether the motion has any impact on when the trial begins. Sixth Circuit's interpretation would potentially extend well beyond pretrial motions and encompass such matters as mental and physical competency examinations, interlocutory appeals, consideration of plea agreements, and the absence of essential witnesses. The Sixth Circuit also misinterpreted §3161(h)(1)(F), which excludes from the 70-day calculation "delay resulting from transportation of any Defendant to and from places of examination , except that any time consumed in excess of ten days shall be presumed to be unreasonable." The lower courts agreed that a total of20 transportation days had elapsed when Respondent was evaluated for competency, and that because the Government provided no justification, all days in excess of the 10 days specified in the statute were unreasonable. However, the Sixth Circuit exempted 8 weekend days and holidays from the count. Thus, the Circuit considered only two transportation days excessive, and the parties concede that the eight extra days were enough to make the difference between compliance with, and violation of, the Act. Hence, Sixth Circuit's interpretation of both subparagraph (D) and subparagraph (F), incorrect . Respondent trial failed to comply with the Speedy Trial Act's deadline is correct. Therefore, the Sixth Circuit's judgment ordering dismissal of the indictment on remand is Affirmed.