• CRIMINAL LAWS

Held, Order of the Magistrate taking cognizance under Section 190 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(CrPC) and issuing process against the Petitioner and her husband under Section 204 of CrPC could not have been interfered with by the High Court in the Revision filed by the Petitioner. Moreover, once the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance and issuing process against the Petitioner and her husband was sustained, there was no scope for granting the relief of further investigation for the purpose of finding out whether someone other than the Petitioner and her husband had committed the offences in respect of the deceased persons. Review Petition dismissed.

• DIRECT TAXATION LAWS

Held, In the present case, the cause shown by the Assessee for repayment of the loan/deposit otherwise than by account payee cheque/bank draft was on account of the fact that the Assessee was liable to receive amount towards the sale price of the shares sold by the Assessee to the person from whom loan/deposit was received by the Assessee. It would have been an empty formality to repay the loan/deposit amount by account payee cheque/draft and receive back almost the same amount towards the sale price of the shares. Neither the genuineness of the receipt of loan/deposit nor the transaction of repayment of loan by way of adjustment through book entries out in the ordinary course of business has been doubted in the regular assessment. There was nothing on record to suggest that the amounts advanced by Investment Trust of India to the Assessee represented the unaccounted money of the Investment Trust of India or the Assessee. The fact that the Assessee Company belonged to the Ketan Parekh Group which was involved in the securities scam could not be a ground for sustaining penalty imposed under Section 271E of the Act if reasonable cause was shown by the Assessee for failing to comply with the provisions of Section 269T. It was not in dispute that settling the claims by making journal entries in the respective books was also one of the recognized modes of repaying loan / deposit. Therefore, in the facts of the present case, though the Assessee had violated the provisions of Section 269T, the Assessee had shown reasonable cause. Hence, order passed by Tribunal deleting the penalty imposed was acceptable.

• COMMERCIAL LAWS

Held, In the present case, even the stage of evaluation of technical proposal under clause 27.2.b was over and the financial proposals given by the bidders were opened, as per clause 27.2.c. After opening of the financial bid, Respondent No.1 was obliged to allocate weighted score for the concerned heads mentioned in clause 27.2.e. After seeking necessary clarification from the bidders, the Concerned Authority could assign suitable weighted score for the head Internal Rate of Return equity under clause 27.2.e.ii. However, the offer could not be kept completely out from consideration - much less treated as disqualification or ineligibility of the bidder, which was the purport of the reason recorded in the impugned resolution. However, this did not mean that the Petitioners should necessarily secure full 45 weighted score because of having quoted zero percent IRR. That exercise had to be undertaken by the Concerned Authority on the basis of its subjective satisfaction. It would be sufficient to observe that the reason weighed with Respondent No.1 of treating the bid submitted by the Petitioners as ineligible on the ground that it provided for zero percent IRR could be sustained and was bordering on discrimination and arbitrariness. Petition allowed.

• CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS

Dr. Meena Vs. The Vice Chancellor (Decided on 11.06.2012) MANU/MH/0720/2012

Held, In the service jurisprudence, termination was a concept which crystallized into snapping relationship of master and servant. The term 'otherwise termination' would have to be looked into from that angle. In the case of compulsory retirement by way of punishment or without punishment definitely there is a snapping of relationship of master and servant as in the case of forced resignation. Whether or not such a person got pension due to the nature of compulsory retirement that was without punishment would not make any difference for bringing the same into the fold of term 'otherwise termination'. The principle, namely ubi jus ibi remedium was squarely attracted in the case at hand. Intention of the legislature in inserting the words 'otherwise termination' by providing Appeal under Section 59 of the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994, was obviously to provide a forum, namely appellate forum, when an employee was aggrieved by the predatory action of the Management in snapping the relationship of master and servant by taking resort to the order of compulsory retirement with or without punishment. Thus, it would not be legal and proper to deny a special forum created by the Legislature, namely appellate forum under the Maharashtra Universities Act, 1994 for hearing grievances of such employees, who can file Appeal under Section 59 of the Maharashtra Universities act, 1994. To give narrow meaning to the words 'otherwise termination' was to deny important appellate forum and to make the said part of the provision nugatory.

• SERVICE LAWS

Held, Court observed that in view of the law enunciated by the Apex Court in several decisions, the absorption/appointments of the private Respondents in the employment of the Respondent No. 2 was clearly violative of the provisions of Section 54 and procedure laid down in Chapter III Schedule D of the BPMC Act, 1949 and in particular, Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

• RIGHT TO INFORMATION LAWS

Held, In the instant case, action taken by Respondent No.1 in suspending the NSOP of the Petitioner could not be explained in light of the fact that in relation to M/S Indo Copters Pvt Ltd – another company operating under NSOP granted by Respondent to operate the helicopter service in India wherein the only action was to require the removal of the majority shareholder. The NSOP of the other company had not been suspended by the Respondents. It was not explained as to what was the difference in the two cases. Further, the Respondents had not been able to show from the record as to what suddenly propelled them to withdraw the security clearance of Petitioner when till very recently they were dealing with providing special security measures to VVIP'S. Petition dismissed

• CONSTITUTIONAL LAWS

Held, In the instant case, Respondent's counsel had tried to play down the role of the Government by submitting that it was confined to the proper utilization of the grant. This argument stood negatived by the provisions of the Memorandum of Association and Rules. No doubt, every autonomous body with some kind of Government involvement could not be construed to be "State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, 1950 . However, when Court found that National Book Trust (NBT) was within the tight grip of the Government and the control of the Government ran through at every stage right from the creation of the NBT, to the appointment of the members, to the fundings, to the appointment of various functionaries, to the controlling of the functioning through those appointed members and also through means of audit and further that the parameters within which NBT was to function, and even when the amendments were to be carried out, there could not be any other conclusion but to say that it was an altar ego of the Government's instrumentality.

• SERVICE LAWS

Held, In the instant case, it was clear that the Petitioners were seeking benefit under the OMs of 1980 and 2006. Those OMs were clearly in respect of Central Government employees. The Respondent was an autonomous corporation. Employees of Respondent were not Central Government employees. Since the said OMs of 1980 and 2006 did not ipso facto apply to the Respondent inasmuch as the Respondent was an autonomous body, they could yet be applied if the DTC had adopted the same. However, in point of fact, the Respondent had not adopted the said OMs. Petitioner's Counsel was unable to show any document, evidencing adoption of the said OMs by the Respondent. As such the Petitioner could not take the benefit under the said OMs.

• DIRECT TAXATION LAWS

Held, In the instant case, a perusal of the record showed that for valuation of stock, the Assessee had been following a particular method. The Assessing Officer (AO) while valuating the closing stock relevant to the assessment year had adopted FIFO method in an arbitrary manner without justifying the reason for change in valuation method. Similarly, for other additions made, the AO had failed to give any cogent reasons for making additions. Further, even the order of Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) (CIT-A) was sketchy and non-speaking order. Therefore, it was deemed appropriate to remand the matter back to the AO to decide the matter afresh by adopting method of valuation of stock as adopted by the Assessee in the earlier years and thereafter calculate, difference if any, in the valuation of closing stock as per the provisions of the Act and also to decide other issues as per the provisions of law by giving detailed reasons for making additions. Appeal by Revenue allowed in aforesaid terms for statistical purposes.

Held, In the present case, inspite of various opportunities provided to the Assessee, the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) had dismissed the Assessee's Appeal on the ground that the Assessee had not paid self assessment tax and had not produced the books of accounts. In the absence of any material to show that the Assessee was asked to produce the books of accounts and keeping in view that the Assessee in the Memorandum of Appeal i.e. (Form No. 35) filed before the CIT(A) had mentioned that the admitted tax had duly been deposited, Court was of the view that the CIT(A) was not justified in dismissing the Assessee's Appeal without providing specific opportunity of being heard to the Assessee. Appeal of Assessee partly allowed for statistical purposes.