• MEDIA AND ENTERTAINMENT LAWS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, NINTH CIRCUIT

Monge Vs. Maya Magazines Inc LLC (Decided on 14.08.2012)

Copyright infringement - Appeal filed against order of District Court granting Respondent summary judgement on ground that publication of images was fair use under the Copyright Act, 1976

Held, The Court observed that overprotecting intellectual property was as harmful as under protecting it. Creativity was impossible without a rich public domain. In the present case, to satisfy a celebrity couple's desire to control their public images, the majority extended inapposite case law to undercut the fair use doctrine and the free press. Therefore, , the Court affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment on fair use grounds, at least as to the three images of the wedding in the expos‚, and remand due to disputed issues of material fact regarding the use of the remaining two non wedding photos. Hence, the decision passed by the District Court was reversed.

• INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

Raytheon Company Vs. Indigo Systems Corporation and Flir Systems Inc (Decided on 01.08.2012)

Grant of trade secret misappropriation - Appeal filed against decision of District Court dismissing Appellant's claim against Respondent on the ground that they were time-barred

Held, In the instant case, the District Court essentially concluded that from year 2000 onwards, Appellant was on permanent inquiry notice and therefore had a constant duty to investigate all acts of competition by Respondent for evidence of misappropriation. The District Court presumed that because Appellant once suspected Respondent, therefore, as a matter of law, it should have continued to suspect Respondent after year 2000 onwards. But, this presumption ignores Respondent's assurances and was impermissible under both Texas and California law, because, whether or not the discovery rule applied was ordinarily a question of fact in both states. Moreover, It was for the jury and not for the District Court to determine when Appellant should have first discovered the facts supporting its cause of action. Therefore, District Court erred by resolving genuine factual disputes in favor of Respondent, when it concluded that Appellant should have discovered its cause of action before March 2, 2004. Hence, the grant of summary judgment was reversed and matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

• ARBITRATION LAWS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FIRST CIRCUIT

Volkswagen Group of America Inc Volkswagen AG Audi Vs. Peter McNulty Law Firm Irwin Boesen Berger Montague (Decided on 27.07.2012)

Source of law governing the fee Award - Appeal filed against an order of District Court's Award in attorneys' fees to several groups of Plaintiffs' attorney who achieved a class action settlement agreement

Held, In the instant case, under both methods used by Massachusetts law, a question remaining on remand was the question of the appropriate contingency enhancement, if any. Further, the District Court's choice of a multiplier figure was not based on Massachusetts law nor justified by the record, and it was therefore vacated. Moreover, this Court understood the parties to have agreed that if there were a remand, the issues open on remand would include inter alia the further time remaining to be spent by all counsel, not just class counsel, the risks undertaken and the value of settlement. Hence, it was held that where there was an agreement that the Defendants will pay reasonable fees, state law governed the Award of fees.

• BANKRUPTCY LAWS

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS, FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Supernova Vs. Ian J.Gazes (Decided on 02.08.2012)

Recovery of amount - Appeal filed against judgment of District Court affirming a judgment of Bankrupt Court denying claim for recovery of post-petition rent, attorneys' fees and interest

Held, This Court observed that a lease was "unexpired" for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code where the tenant has the power to revive the lease under applicable state law. Since in New York it was the execution, and not the issuance, of the warrant of eviction that extinguished the tenant's interest in a lease, until the warrant was executed, the lease was "unexpired" for purposes of Section 365(d)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code. Even so, the question of whether a Trustee was required affirmatively to reject a "terminated" yet "unexpired" lease or whether such a lease should be treated as presumptively rejected was not briefed or argued before either the Bankruptcy Court or the District Court. Accordingly, the Court remands the case to the Bankruptcy Court so that it could decide that issue in the first instance. If its determination of that issue left the question of whether AGC or the Trustee remained in possession of the property as determinative of whether the Appellant was entitled to rental payments and other costs under Section 365(d)(3), the Bankruptcy Court must decide that issue, but only after resolving the factual dispute. Hence, judgment of the District Court was vacated and the case was remanded to the District Court with instructions to remand to the Bankruptcy Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.